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Abstract
In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equi-
librium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a
multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence
of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the endogenization
of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to - through self-
fulfilling expectations - dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles
of length two even for very high majority rules.
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1 Introduction
In general equilibrium models with production and incomplete financial mar-
kets, agents (consumers/shareholders) trade assets, but at the market equi-
librium, their gradients are typically not collinear: they disagree on the way
to evaluate income streams outside the market span. Hence profit maximiza-
tion is not a well defined objective for firms.1
A way to resolve these disputes between shareholders is based on majority
voting in assemblies of shareholders.2 Among others Dre`ze (1985) and De-
Marzo (1993) propose the same concept of majority-stable equilibria: within
each firm, the production plans of other firms remaining fixed, no alternative
production plan should be able to rally a majority of the shares against the
status quo. As Gevers (1974) already noted, the first problem this approach
runs into is existence: Plott (1967) shows that in multi-dimensional voting
models, a simple majority political equilibrium typically does not exist.3 Su-
per majority rules are a way to ensure existence: to defeat the status quo,
a challenger should rally a proportion larger than 50% of the voting popu-
lation.4 The question of what a ‘suitable’ level a super majority is, arises:
it should be high enough to ensure existence, and low enough not to be
1For details on standard general equilibrium models of production with incomplete
markets and the roles of the firms, see, e.g., Magill & Quinzii (1996) and the references
therein.
2The choice of a state contingent production plan in a publicly traded corporation is
a genuine problem of social choice. This problem has been profoundly important in the
history of economic thought as Arrow’s impossibility theorem arose out of his eﬀort to
find mechanisms for solving disagreements in such cases.
3Benninga & Muller (1979) have shown that if production possibility frontiers are
unidimensional, then 50% majority voting works. Another condition ensuring existence of
50% majority equilibria is that the degree of market incompleteness is equal to one, see
Cres (2000) and Tvede & Cre`s (2005).
4To get existence, Dre`ze (1985) gives veto power to some shareholders. This result
is generalized in Kelsey & Milne (1996) to encompass other voting rules, such as the
generalized median voter rules, a special case of which has been applied to decision theory
in firms by Sadanand & Williamson (1991).
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too conservative. The standard way to proceed is to associate to each pro-
posal its (Simpson-Kramer) score. The score of a proposal (the incumbent,
or status quo) is the fraction of the voting population supporting, against
this proposal, its most dangerous challenger, i.e., the alternative proposal
that rallies the maximal fraction of voters against the incumbent. The most
stable proposals are the ones with lowest score, the so-called min-max.
A central questions is: For which rate of super majority is the min-max
stable? We illustrate the diﬃculty to answer this question through the in-
vestigation of an economy where consumers/investors have linear-quadratic
utility functions. A nice observation is that the majority voting mechanism is
likely to implement equilibria which have the nicest possible welfare proper-
ties one can hope for in an incomplete financial market environment. Indeed,
looking at the first-order conditions of constrained Pareto optimality, Dre`ze
(1974) argues that profit should be maximized with respect to shadow prices
that average the idiosyncratic shadow prices of all shareholders; hence with
respect to the shadow prices of the ‘mean shareholder’. From Caplin & Nale-
buﬀ (1991) we know conditions under which the latter is a proxy to the
min-max and is likely to be stable with respect to a rate of super majority
inferior to 64%.
But even there things might not turn that simple. Since the electorate is
endogenous, its composition is influenced by the agents’ expectations. The
classical concept of majority voting equilibrium supposes that shareholders
have ‘conservative’ expectations: at equilibrium they expect that no chal-
lenger can defeat the status quo; therefore they believe that the status quo
production plans are going to prevail in the future; so they stick to their
current portfolios. In equilibrium, given these current portfolios, conserv-
ative expectations are self-fulfilling: no challenger can rally a high enough
majority against the status quo. Hence voting equilibria may be viewed as
plain Nash equilibria (see Dre`ze (1989), pp. 48-49).
But what happens if shareholders deviate from these conservative expec-
tations? If they expect a challenger to defeat the status quo, they rebalance
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their portfolios; and it might be the case that, given the new distribution of
voting weights/shares, the challenger rallies a high enough majority against
the status quo and the expectations are fulfilled.
We expect that an equilibrium which is stable under conservative expec-
tations might not be stable if agents’ expectations deviate. Indeed, suppose
a firm changes its production plan from y to y’, then it changes the div-
idend matrix for investors/consumers. Therefore consumers whose invest-
ment needs are less covered by y’ than by y might exit - at least partially -
from the capital of the firm: they will sell shares to consumers whose needs
are better covered by y’ than by y. Hence deviating from conservative ex-
pectations might enlarge the voting weight of the consumers who are better
oﬀ with the challenger y’ and diminishes the voting weight of the consumers
who are better oﬀ with the status quo y : This exit eﬀect gives more voting
weight in the corporate control mechanism to the shareholders who favor
the challenger over the status quo. Clearly if these deviating expectations
are confirmed at equilibrium, then the status quo is not stable. At equilib-
rium, deviation from conservative expectations should not be confirmed. We
provide a new concept of equilibrium where such deviating expectations are
never confirmed at equilibrium: we dub it majority exit-stable equilibrium.
It is shown that generically a (weakly) higher rate is necessary for the
corporate charter to secure that a ρ-majority equilibrium is exit-stable. A
robust example is provided where a strictly higher rate is needed. The ex-
tent to which the corporate charter needs to be increased to secure that a
ρ-majority equilibrium is exit-stable depends on the case under considera-
tion. We provide an example where no 50%-majority equilibrium is exit-
stable for any rate of super majority. This example gives rise to Condorcet
cycles between two alternatives, even for rates of super majority very close
to unanimity. Since expectations, whether they are conservative or not, are
significant for stability of equilibria, it is natural to think of stability as being
influenced by a ‘political sunspot’. In general, on the one hand conservative
expectations should result in stability because majority equilibria exist for
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rather low rates of super majority and on the other hand non-conservative
expectations should result in instability perhaps in the form of proxy fights
and hostile takeovers.
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 and 4 define the concept of ρ-majority equilibrium, provides computations
and links eﬃciency to stability. Section 5 introduces the concept of exit-
stability, and, through a simple geometric example, it explores the possible
occurrence of political sunspots, and of Condorcet cycles of length two for
any rate of super majority.
2 Setup
Consider an economy with 2 dates, t ∈ {0, 1}, 1 state at the first date s = 0,
and S states at the second date s ∈ {1, . . . , S}. The probability distribution
over the set of states at date 1 is π = (π1, . . . ,πS) where πs > 0. There are:
1 commodity at every state, a continuum of consumers φ ∈ Φ where Φ is the
set of characteristics of consumers, and J firms j ∈ {1, . . . , J}.
Consumers are characterized by their initial endowments ω = (ω0,ω1, . . . ,ωS)
where ωs ∈ R and preference parameters γ > 0. Utility functions are of
the linear-quadratic type, so the utility of the consumption bundle x =
(x0, x1, . . . , xS) where xs ∈ R of a consumer with preference parameter γ
is
uγ(x) = x
0 +
S3
s=1
πs
w
γxs − 1
2
(xs)2
W
Therefore preferences are of mean-variance type with identical linear risk tol-
erances. The distribution of consumers is described by a probability measure
on the product of the set of initial endowments and the set of preference
paremeters φ = (ω, γ) ∈ RS+1 × R++. The set of characteristics Φ is sup-
posed to be endowed with the Borel σ-algebra. The probability measure on
the set of characteristics is supposed to have compact and convex support
Φ ⊂ RS+1 × R++ and to be described by a continuous density f : Φ → R+.
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Let Ω = (Ω0,Ω1, . . . ,ΩS) where
Ω =
8
Φ
ω f(φ)dφ
be the mean of initial endowment vectors and let Γ where
Γ =
8
Φ
γ f(φ)dφ
be the mean of the preference parameters.
Firms are characterized by their production sets Yj ⊂ RS+1. Production
sets are supposed to be convex and the set of eﬃcient production plans Zj,
where Zj is defined by
Zj = {yj ∈ Yj|({yj}+ RS+1+ ) ∩ Yj = {yj}},
is supposed to be compact. It is assumed that if yj ∈ co Zj for all j, then
the dividend matrix
y1 =
⎛
⎜⎝
y11 · · · y1J
...
...
yS1 · · · ySJ
⎞
⎟⎠
has rank J .
Consumers have shares in firms and the distribution of shares is described
by an integrable function δ = (δ1, . . . , δJ) : Φ→ RJ+ such that8
Φ
δj(φ) f(φ)dφ = 1.
It is of no importance whether shares are assumed to be non-negative or not.
Here shares are assumed to be non-negative.
Let q = (q1, . . . , qJ) be the price vector, then the problem of consumer φ
is
max
(x,θ)
x0 +
S3
s=1
πs
w
γxs − 1
2
(xs)2
W
s.t.
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x0 − ω0 =

j qjδj(φ)−

j(qj − y0j )θj
xs − ωs =

j y
s
jθj for all s ≥ 1.
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3 Stock Market Equilibrium
Definition 1 A stock market equilibrium (with fixed production plans)
is an integrable consumption map, an integrable portfolio map, a price vector
and a list of production plans (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y) where x∗ : Φ → RS+1, θ∗ : Φ →
RJ , q∗ ∈ RJ and y = (y1, . . . , yJ) such that:
• consumers maximize utilities, so (x∗(φ), θ∗(φ)) is a solution to the prob-
lem of consumer φ given y and q∗, and;
• markets clear, so for all j ∈ {1, . . . , J}
$
Φ x
∗(φ) f(φ)dφ =
$
Φ ω f(φ)dφ
$
Φ θ
∗(φ) f(φ)dφ =
⎛
⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Suppose that (θ∗, x∗, q∗, y) is a stock market equilibrium, then the first-
order condition for the problem of consumer φ is
Dxuγ(x
∗(φ))
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
y01 − q1 · · · y0J − qJ
y11 · · · y1J
...
...
yS1 · · · ySJ
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 0.
Therefore let subscript 1 denote the last S coordinates of a vector, let 1S
(1J) denote the row-vector with S (J) coordinates where all coordinates are
equal to 1 and let Π denote the S×S matrix with π in the diagonal, then as a
function of the characteristics and the portfolio of a consumer the equilibrium
price vector is
q∗ = y0 + (γ1S − ω1 − y1θ∗(φ))TΠy1.
Hence the equilibrium price vector is
q∗ = y0 + (Γ1S − Ω1 − y11J)TΠy1.
7
Thus at a stock market equilibrium, for consumer φ the portfolio, the con-
sumption at date 1 and the gradient of consumption at date 1 are
θ∗T = (y0 − q∗ + (γ1S − ω1)Πy1)(yT1Πy1)−1
= 1J + ((γ − Γ)1S + (Ω1 − ω1))Πy1(yT1Πy1)−1
x∗1 = ω1 + θ
∗TyT1
= ω1 + 1JyT1 + ((γ − Γ)1S + (Ω1 − ω1))Πy1(yT1Πy1)−1yT1
Dx1uγ(x
∗) = (γ1S − ω1 − 1JyT1 )Π
−((γ − Γ)1S + (Ω1 − ω1))Πy1(yT1Πy1)−1yT1Π
It is assumed that for all consumers the consumption at date 1 is below the
bliss-point, so x∗s1 (φ) < γ for all φ and s ≥ 1.
4 Majority Stable Equilibria
The problem of firm j is more complicated to state than the problem of
consumer φ because in firms consumers vote over production plans. Let
(q∗, x∗, θ∗, y) be a stock market equilibrium and let yIj be a challenger to yj,
then consumer φ votes for the challenger if and only if consumer φ is better
oﬀ
uγ(x
∗(φ) + (yIj − yj)θ∗j (φ)) > uγ(x∗(φ)).
Let Φ(x∗, θ∗, y, yIj) ⊂ Φ be the set of consumers that vote for the challenger.
Since the dimension of the set of alternatives may be higher than one, super-
majority rules may be needed to ensure political stability in firms, so let ρ ∈
[0, 1] be the majority rule. Then at a stock market equilibrium (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y)
the preferred set of firm j is defined by
P ρj (x
∗, θ∗j , yj) =
l
yIj ∈ Yj
eeeee
$
Φ(x∗,θ∗,y,yIj)
max{θ∗j (φ), 0} f(φ)dφ$
Φmax{θ∗j (φ), 0} f(φ)dφ
> ρ
M
.
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Therefore a challenger production plan is preferred to a status quo production
plan if and only if ρ × 100 percent of the consumers are better oﬀ with the
change. The production plan yj is a solution to the problem of firm j if and
only if P ρj (x
∗, θ∗j , y) = ∅.
Definition 2 A ρ-majority stable equilibrium is an integrable consump-
tion map, a integrable portfolio map, a price vector and a list of production
plans (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) such that:
• (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) is a stock market equilibrium, and;
• y∗j is a solution to the problem of firm j so P ρj (x∗, θ∗j , y∗j ) = 0.
Since utility functions are quasi-concave, if
uγ(x
∗(φ) + (yIj − yj)θ∗(φ)) > uγ(x∗(φ)),
then for all τ ∈ [0, 1[
uγ(x
∗(φ) + ((1− τ)yIj + τyj − yj)θ∗(φ)) > uγ(x∗(φ)).
Therefore if the distance between the challenger and the status quo decreases,
then the fraction of consumers who are better oﬀ with the challenger com-
pared to the status quo increases.
Observation 1 Suppose that (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y) is a stock market equilibrium and
that Uj is an open neighborhood relative to Yj of yj, then P
ρ
j (x
∗, θ∗j , yj)∩Uj = ∅
if and only if P ρj (xj, θ
∗
j , yj) = ∅.
According to the minimal diﬀerentiation principle only infinitesimal changes
of production plans need to be considered and for infinitesimal changes first-
order approximations of utility function can be used to evaluate changes in
utility; At a stock market equilibrium (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y) consumer φ is better oﬀ
with a change in direction v of the production plan in firm j if and only if
there exists τ > 0 such that
uγ(x
∗(φ) + τvθ∗j (φ)) > uγ(x
∗(φ)).
9
so consumer φ is better oﬀ with a change in direction v if and only if
Duγ(x
∗(φ))vθ∗j (φ) > 0.
In a general setup, Tvede & Cre`s (2005) shows that (S − J)/(S − J + 1)
is the lowest rate for which majority stable equilibria exist where (S − J)
is the number of missing markets. The drawback of this result is that in
case markets are very incomplete (i.e., (S − J) is large), one needs a super-
majority close to unanimity to ensure existence of equilibria. In the present
parametric setup, a dimension-free rate can be given for existence of stable
equilibria. It comes as a straightforward application of Theorem 1 in Caplin
& Nalebuﬀ (1991), an application whose possibility is mentioned in Caplin
& Nalebuﬀ (1991) Example 4.2.
Theorem 1 in Caplin & Nalebuﬀ (1991) states that, in an n-dimensional
subspace, there is no way to cut linearly a compact and convex support
endowed with a ν-concave distribution through its centroid so that one of
the two resulting pieces is larger than 100r(n+ 1/ν) percent of the weight.
All ingredients are present to apply Theorem 1 in Caplin & Nalebuﬀ
(1991); indeed, at stock market equilibria: 1. portfolios θ∗(φ) depend linearly
on characteristics φ; 2. the set of characteristics where shares in firm j are
non-negative is convex; 3. voting weights max{θ∗j (φ), 0} depend linearly on
characteristics in the set of characteristics where shares in firm j are non-
negative, and; 4. gradients Duγ(x
∗(φ)) depend linearly on characteristics
φ.
The dimensionality here is given by the number of parameters in φ,
hence (n =) S + 2. If we restrict our study to the set of φ’s where shares
in firm j are positive (which is, according to the latter point 3., compact
and convex) then consumer φ is better oﬀ with a change in direction v if
and only if Duγ(x
∗(φ))v > 0 ; one therefore sees that the subset of con-
sumers/parameters φ which are better oﬀ with a change in direction v is
defined (thanks to the latter point 4) as a linear cutting of a compact convex
support through the centroid of the considered distribution; moreover the
density of the distribution of voting weights on vj(y
∗) is θj(y∗,φ)f(φ) where
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θj is 1-concave and f is σ-concave; so according to Lemma 1 in the appendix
the density is σ/(σ + 1)-concave. Hence according to Theorem 1 in Caplin
& Nalebuﬀ (1991) (q∗, (x∗, θ∗), y∗) where q∗ = q(y∗), x∗(φ) = x(y∗,φ) and
θ∗(φ) = θ(y∗,φ) is a ρ-majority equilibrium for ρ ≥ r(S + 3 + 1/σ).
Observation 2 Let r : R+ → R+ be defined by
r(a) = 1−
w
a
a+ 1
Wa
.
Suppose that f : Φ→ R+ is σ-concave, so for all φ,φI ∈ Φ and τ ∈ [0, 1]
f((1− τ)φ+ τφI)σ ≥ (1− τ)f(φ)σ + τf(φI)σ.
Then for all ρ ≥ r(S + 3 + 1/σ) there exist ρ-majority equilibria.
The proof of the observation is postponed to the appendix. The proof
reveals that a stock market equilibria where the profit of firm j is maximized
with respect to the average gradient of the consumers with positive shares
in firm j exists and is majority stable. Therefore the production plan for
each firm satisfies the Dre`ze criterion and the Dre`ze criterion ensures that
the first-order conditions of constrained Pareto optimality (for consumers
with positive shares) are satisfied. This is as close as we can get to Pareto
optimality given the current state of the art. We find it remarkable that the
Dre`ze criterion can be supported by majority voting.
Two important properties of the linear-quadratic utility functions are
central for Observation 2: 1. the distribution of initial shares does not mat-
ter because utility functions are linear in consumption at date 0, and; 2.
gradients and shares are linear functions of the parameters.
A suﬃcient condition for existence of majority stable equilibria for ρ = 0.5
is that the set of characteristics is one-dimensional because then the median
voter theorem can be applied. (In a multi-dimensional setup it is known
that symmetry conditions on the set of characteristics where shares are non-
negative and on distribution of gradients and portfolios are needed - see
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Grandmont (1978).) In DeMarzo (1993) two other suﬃcient conditions for
existence for ρ = 0.5 are provided: 1. production sets are one-dimensional,
or; 2. the number of missing markets S − J is equal to 1 - see also Tvede
& Cre`s (2005). A simple example that is used in the sequel of the paper is
provided.
A geometric example
There are two states of nature and only one firm, so S = 2 and J = 1. The
probability distribution on the set of states is symmetric so π1 = π2 = 0.5.
Consumers have identical utility functions and initial endowments are 0 at
date 0, so consumers only diﬀer with respect to their initial endowments at
date 1. Endowments at date 1 are distributed on the line between a = (−1, 1)
and b = (1,−1) such that there is no aggregate risk so Ω1 = (0, 0). The set
of eﬃcient production plans Z ⊂ RS is supposed to be defined by
Z = {y ∈ R3+|y0 = 1 and ,(y1, y2), = 1}.
At a stock market equilibrium (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y), for consumer φ the portfolio
is θ∗(φ) = 1− ω1 · y1 so θ∗(φ) ≥ 0 for all ω1 on the line between a and b and
y ∈ Z, and the consumption at date 1 is x∗1(φ) = ω1 + θ∗(φ)y1. Therefore
if y2 > y1 (y2 < y1), then θ∗(φ) is increasing (decreasing) from a to b and
x∗1(φ) is the orthogonal projection of ω1 on the line through y1 othogonal to
Z at y1.
For a challenger yI ∈ Z consumer φ is better oﬀ with the challenger if
and only if u(x∗(φ) + θ∗(φ)(yI − y)) > u(x∗(φ)) or equivalently
γ1S · (yI1 − y1) > ω1 · (yI1 − y1).
because x∗1(φ) = ω1 + θ
∗(φ)y1. Therefore consumers with ω1 below the line
f(y, yI) defined by (γ1S − ω1) · (yI − y) = 0 are better oﬀ with the challenger
yI and consumers with ω1 above the line are better oﬀ with the status quo
y. The problem is sketched in a Hotelling-like model in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: The status quo y vs. the challenger yI
As the challenger yI moves towards the status quo y, the line f(y, yI) turns
clockwise around γ1S. Hence if the distance between the challenger and the
status quo decreases, then the fraction of consumers who are better oﬀ with
the challenger compared to the status quo increases as stated in Observa-
tion 1 on the minimal diﬀerentiation principle. Clearly if the distribution of
consumers on the line from a to b is symmetric, then y∗ where y2∗ = y1∗ is
a ρ-majority stable equilibrium for ρ = 0.5, as the distribution of shares is
uniformly distributed on the line from a to b so θ∗(φ) = 1 for all φ. Moreover
at the ρ-majority stable equilibrium where y2∗ = y1∗ the median voter is
the Dre`ze mean shareholder. Obviously for all y ∈ Z such that y1, y2 > 0,
there exists a symmetric distribution of consumers such that y is a ρ-majority
stable equilibrium for ρ = 0.5.
5 ‘Exit’ expectations
At majority stable equilibria as in the standard equilibrium concepts of the
literature consumers are supposed to have conservative expectations in the
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sense that they expect status quo production plans to be stable. There-
fore consumers expect that no challenger is able to defeat status quo. In
equilibrium these conservative expectations are confirmed: no challenger de-
feats status quo. But what happens if consumers deviate from conservative
expectations?
For a list of status quo production plans y = (y1, . . . , yJ) suppose that con-
sumers expect the challenger yIj to defeat the status quo yj in a proxy fight in
firm j. Then all consumers should trade as if the production plan of firm j is
yIj rather than yj. Hence if (q
I, xI, θI, yI) where yI = (y1, . . . , yj−1, yIj, yj+1, . . . , yJ),
is a stock market equilibrium, then the outcome should be (qI, x˜, θI, y) where
x˜ : Φ→ RS+1 is defined by
⎧
⎨
⎩
x˜0(φ) = ω0 +

j δj(φ)q
I
j −

j θj(φ)(q
I
j − y0j )
x˜s(φ) = ωs +

j θj(φ)y
s
j for all s ≥ 1
so prices and portfolios adjust to expectations: the challenger yIj defeats the
status quo yj. Hence the change of production plan from yj to y
I
j should turn
the outcome into a stock market equilibrium.
Clearly the change from the status quo yj to the challenger y
I
j changes
the dividend matrix, so yIj compared to yj oﬀers new insurance opportuni-
ties. Thus consumers whose insurance needs are less (more) covered by yIj
than by yj will exit (enter) - at least partially - from the capital of the firm.
Hence consumers whose needs are less covered by yIj than by yj sell shares to
consumers whose needs are more covered by yIj than by yj. Thus exit expec-
tations enlarge the voting weight of the consumers who are better oﬀ with
the challenger yIj and diminish the voting weight of the consumers who are
better oﬀ with yj. Clearly if exit expectations are confirmed at equilibrium,
then the status quo is not stable. At equilibrium, exit expectations should
not be confirmed. Therefore another equilibrium concept is proposed.
Definition 3 A ρ-majority exit-stable equilibrium is an integrable con-
sumption map, an integrable portfolio map, a price vector and a list of pro-
duction plans (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) such that:
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• (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) is a stock market equilibrium, and;
• if (q, x, θ, (y∗−j, yj)) is a stock market equilibrium and x˜ : Φ → RS+1 is
defined by
⎧
⎨
⎩
x˜0(φ) = ω0 +

k δk(φ)qk −

k θk(φ)(qk − y∗0k )
x˜s(φ) = ωs +

k θk(φ)y
∗s
k for all s ≥ 1
then P ρk (x˜, θ, y
∗
k) = ∅.
It should be expected that a ρ-majority exit-stable equilibrium is a ρ-
majority stable equilibrium as shown - at least partially - in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Let (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) be a ρ-majority exit-stable equilibrium and
suppose that for all (yn)n∈N there exists (qn, xn, θn)n∈N such that (qn, xn, θn, yn)
is a stockmarket equilibrium and if yn → y∗, then (xn, θn, qn) → (x∗, θ∗, q∗)
in the sup-norm. Then (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium.
The proof of the proposition is postponed to the appendix.
A geometric example - continued
Consider the ρ-majority stable equilibrium (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) where ρ = 0.5 and
y2∗ = y1∗ exhibited at the end of Section 4. Suppose exit expectations
occur. There are two eﬀects working in opposite direction when measuring
the support of the challenger against the status quo. The first eﬀect is the
Hotelling eﬀect depicted on Figure 1: the closer the challenger is to the status
quo, the more consumers are better oﬀ with the challenger. Hence a classical
centripetal force influences the position of the challenger (at the source of the
minimum diﬀerentiation principal in the conservative expectations regime).
But there is another eﬀect which rests on the fact that, under the exit
expectations regime, the distribution of voting shares changes with the po-
sition of the challenger; one then has the exit eﬀect: the further away the
15
challenger is from the status quo, the more shares do consumers, who are
better oﬀ with the challenger, have. Hence a centrifugal force influences the
position of the challenger. Whether the Hotelling eﬀect or the exit eﬀect
dominates depends on the parameters of the model.
We are now presenting examples of distributions where the exit eﬀect
dominates the Hotelling eﬀect. In these examples the median voter disapears.
It can even be the case that in this one-dimensional problem, no equilibria
exists for rates of super-majority strictly smaller than unanimity.
Let endowment at date 1 be parametrized by τ ∈ [−1, 1] such that at
date 1 the endowment of consumer φ is τ in state 1 and −τ in state 2. Let
eﬃcient production plans be parametrized by v ∈ [0, 1] such that at date 1
the production of the firm is v in state 1 and
√
1− v2 in state 2. Suppose
that γ = 1.
Suppose that consumers are uniformly distributed on the line between a =
(−1, 1) and b = (1,−1). For y∗ where y2∗ = y1∗ = 1/
√
2 under conservative
expectations, portfolios are uniformly distributed and consumers with less
(more) endowment in state 1 than in state 2 are better oﬀ with a change of
production plan to a production plan with more (less) output in state 1 and
less in state 2. Therefore y is stable for the majority rule ρ = 0.5. For y where
y1 = y2 = 1/
√
2 under exit expectations where consumers expect z with
z1 = v and z2 =
√
1− v2, the portfolio of consumer φ is 1− τ(v −
√
1− v2)
and consumer φ is better oﬀ with a change of production plan from y to z if
and only if
τ <
v +
√
1− v2 −
√
2
v −
√
1− v2
for v ∈]1/
√
2, 1]. Hence the voting weight of the consumers who are better
oﬀ with z, where z1 = v, z2 =
√
1− v2 and v ∈]1/
√
2, 1], than with y is
8 v+√1−v2−√2
v−
√
1−v2
−1
1
2
(1− τ(v −
√
1− v2)) dτ
=
1
2
(2v −
√
2)(1−
√
1− v2) +
√
2v − 1
v −
√
1− v2
16
The relation between v and the voting weight of the consumers who are better
oﬀ with z than with y is shown in Figure 1 where it is seen that y is exit-
stable for the majority rule ρ ≈ 0.53. Thus in order to ensure exit stability
the majority rule has to be increased from 0.5 to approximately 0.53. But
with 0.53 as majority rule only conservative expectations are self-fulfilling
and quite paradoxically no challenger is supported by more than 50% of the
shares against the status quo so the rate of super majority is not reached.
Figure 2
Clearly for any distribution of endowments there exists a γ such that the
Hotelling eﬀect dominates the exit eﬀect. Indeed the exit eﬀect depends on
θ and θ does not depend on γ because θ = 1−ω1 ·y1 and the Hotelling eﬀect
increases with γ. Hence as γ tends to infinity the rate of super majority
needed to ensure exit-stability converges to 0.5. However if the exit eﬀect
dominates as in Figure 1, then the minimal diﬀerentiation principle does not
apply to consumers with exit expectations.
Suppose that the distribution of consumers on the line between a and b
is described by a density fα : [−1, 1]→ R+, where α ≥ 0, defined by
fα(τ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
α(−τ)2α + 1
2(α+ 1)
for τ ∈ [−1, 0[
α(τ)2α +
1
2(α+ 1)
for τ ∈ [0, 1]
Then the mass of consumers is one for all α. Moreover it is the uniform
distribution for α = 0 and it converges to the distribution where all the mass
is equally split between a and b as α tends to ∞. For a production plan
y where y1 = v and y2 =
√
1− v2 and v ∈ [1/
√
2, 1], under conservative
expectations the voting weight of the consumers who are better oﬀ with a
production plan with a marginally larger production than v state 1 and a
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marginally smaller production than
√
1− v2 in state 2 is
Wα(v) =
8 √1−v2−v√
1−v2+v
−1
(1− τ(v −
√
1− v2))
w
α(−τ)2α + 1
2(α+ 1)
W
dτ
=
1
2(α+ 1)
w
1 +
√
1− v2 − v√
1− v2 + v
W
+
v −
√
1− v2
4(α+ 1)
X
1−
w√
1− v2 − v√
1− v2 + v
W2~
+
α
2α+ 1
X
1−
w
−
√
1− v2 − v√
1− v2 + v
W2α+1~
+
α(v −
√
1− v2)
2(α+ 1)
X
1−
w
−
√
1− v2 − v√
1− v2 + v
W2(α+1)~
.
Clearly Wα : [1/
√
2, 1]→ [0, 1] is continuous, Wα(1/
√
2) = 0.5 and Wα(1) =
0 and limα→∞Wα(v) = 1/2 + (v −
√
1− v2)/2 > 0.5 for all v ∈]1/
√
2, 1[.
Therefore there exists a sequence (αn, vn)n∈N, where limn→∞ αn = ∞ and
limn→∞ vn = 1 with vn ∈]1/
√
2, 1[ for all n, such that Wαn(vn) = 0.5 for all
n. Hence under conservative expectations vn and by symmetry
0
1− v2n are
stable for ρ = 0.5 for the distribution fαn.
Under exit expectations, suppose that
√
1− v2 where v ∈]1/
√
2, 1], is
the status quo and that v is the challenger so consumers expect v to defeat√
1− v2, then the voting weight of the consumers who are better oﬀ with v
than with
√
1− v2 is
W eα(v) =
8 0
−1
(1− τ(v −
√
1− v2))
w
α(−τ)2α + 1
2(α+ 1)
W
dτ
=
1
2(α+ 1)
+
v −
√
1− v2
4(α+ 1)
+
α
2α+ 1
+
α(v −
√
1− v2)
2(α+ 1)
Therefore limn→∞W
e
αn(vn) = 1 because limn→∞ vn = 1. Hence for all ρ < 1
there exists n that vn and
0
1− v2n is a 2-cycle in the sense that if
0
1− v2n
18
resp. vn is the status quo, but consumers expect the challenger vn resp.0
1− v2n to defeat the status quo, then the majority for challenger is larger
than ρ.
Under exit expectations, for every ρ ∈ [0, 1[, there exist α¯, ε > 0, such that
for α > α¯: 1. if v ∈ [0, ε]∪ [1− ε, 1], then the voting weight of the consumers
who are better oﬀ with
√
1− v2 is larger than ρ, and; 2. if v ∈ [ε, 1−ε], then
the voting weight of the consumers who are better oﬀ with either 0 or 1 is
larger than ρ. Therefore for every ρ ∈ [0, 1[ there exists N ∈ N such that if
n ≥ N , then no production plan is exit stable.
Under conservative expectations, there exist stable production plans for
the simple majority rule. Under exit expectations for all super-majority rules
there exist distributions of consumers such that: no production plan is exit-
stable, and; there exist 2-cycles of stable production plans (v and
√
1− v2 are
stable under conservative expectations and if consumers expect v to defeat√
1− v2, then v defeats
√
1− v2 and if consumers expect
√
1− v2 to defeat
v, then
√
1− v2 defeats v).
6 Final remarks
For conservative expectations we have shown in our setup that if shares
are traded before production plans are decided as in Dre`ze (1974), then the
initial distribution of shares is without importance for stability. However if
shares are traded after production plans are decided as in Grossman & Hart
(1979), then the initial distribution of shares matter. Indeed in order to apply
Caplin & Nalebuﬀ (1991) the initial distribution of shares has to be assumed
to be σ-concave. Therefore, in our setup, markets have an important role in
smoothing shares.
For exit expectations we have shown in our setup that if shares are traded
before production plans are decided, then markets may be destabilizing in the
sense that stability cannot be ensured because the challenger is expected to
defeat the status quo. If share are traded after production plans are decided,
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then expectations are without importance. Therefore there seems to be a
tradeoﬀ between on the one hand the smoothing eﬀect of markets and on the
other hand the destabilizing eﬀect of markets.
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Appendix
The product of a α-concave and a β-concave distribution
Lemma 1 If G : K → R+ is α-concave and H : K → R+ is β-concave.
Then F : K → R+ defined by F (a) = G(a)H(a) for all a ∈ K is ν-concave
for all
ν ≤ αβ
α+ β
.
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Proof: It follows from the definition of ν -concavity that if
(((1− t)G(a)α + tG(b)α)1/α((1− t)H(a)β + tH(b)β)1/β)ν
≥ (1− t)(G(a)H(a))ν + t(G(b)H(b))ν
for all a, b ∈ K and t ∈ [0, 1] then F : K → R+ is ν-concave.
Let g, h : [0, 1]→ R+ be defined by
g(t) = ((1− t)G(a)α + tG(b)α)1/α
h(t) = ((1− t)H(a)β + tH(b)β)1/β
then g is α-concave and h is β-concave. Let f : [0, 1] → R+ be defined by
f(t) = (g(t)h(t))ν then the second-order derivative is
D2f = ν(gh)ν−2((ν − 1)((gDf)2 + (fDg)2) + 2ν(gDf)(fDg)
+fg(gD2f + fD2g))
≤ ν(gh)ν−2((ν − α)(gDf)2 + 2ν(gDf)(fDg) + (ν − β)(fDg)2).
The “≤” follows from the fact that g being α-concave is equivalent to gα
being concave so D2gα = αgα−2((α− 1)(Dg)2+ gD2g) ≤ 0 implying gD2g ≤
(1− α)(Dg)2 — similarly for h and β.
Finally (ν − α)(gDf)2 + 2ν(gDf)(fDg) + (ν − β)(fDg)2) ≤ 0 for all
values of gDf and fDg if and only if ν ≤ αβ/(α+ β). Hence, F : K → R+
is ν-concave for all ν ≤ αβ/(α+ β).
Q.E.D
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Proof of Observation 2
Let the maps q : co Z → RJ , θ : co Z × Φ → RJ and x : co Z × Φ → RS+1
be defined by
q(y) = y0 + (Γ1S − Ω1 − y11J)TΠy1
θ(y,φ) = (y0 − q∗ + (γ1S − ω1)Πy1)(yT1Πy1)−1
= 1J + ((γ − Γ)1S + (Ω1 − ω1))Πy1(yT1Πy1)−1
x(y,φ) = (ω0 + q(y)δ(φ)− (q(y)− y0)θ(y,φ),ω1 + θ(y,φ)yT1 )
Then all maps are continuous and θ and x are linear in characteristics.
Let the correspondences v1, . . . , vJ : co Z → Φ be defined by
vj(y) = {φ|θj(y,φ) ≥ 0}.
Then all correspondences are continuous and convex valued. Let the maps
π1, . . . ,πJ : co Z → RS+1 be defined by
πj(y) =
8
vj(y)
Duγ(x(y,φ)) θj(y,φ)f(φ)dφ.
Then all maps are continuous.
Let the correspondences pj : co Z → co Zj be defined by
pj(y) = {yIj|∀zIj ∈ co Zj : πj(y)zIj ≤ πj(y)yj}.
Then all correspondences are upper hemi-continuous. Therefore according
to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem there exists y∗ such that y∗j ∈ pj(y∗) for
all j and y∗j ∈ Zj because by assumption Duγ(x(y,φ)) ∈ RS+1++ for all φ.
Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 1
Let (q∗, x∗, θ∗, y∗) be a ρ-majority exit-stable equilibrium and suppose that
for all (yn)n∈N there exists (qn, xn, θn)n∈N such that (qn, xn, θn, yn) is a stock-
market equilibrium and if yn → y∗, then (xn, θn, qn)→ (x∗, θ∗, q∗) in the sup-
norm. Therefore if (1/,ynj −y∗j,)(ynj −y∗j )→ vj and θ∗(φ)Duγ(x∗(φ)) ·vj > 0,
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then there exists N such that if n ≥ N , then uγ(xn(φ) + θj(φ)(ynj − y∗j )) >
uγ(xn(φ)), because (qn, xn, θn)→ (q∗, x∗, θ∗) in the sup-norm and because the
utility function is continuous. Hence if a ρ-majority exit-stable equilibrium,
then it is a ρ-majority stable equilibrium.
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 Figure 2: Rate of super-majority 
